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Background and objectives: It is well established that attention bias and interpretation bias each have a
key role in the development and continuation of anxiety. How the biases may interact with one another
in anxiety is, however, poorly understood. Using cognitive bias modiﬁcation techniques, the present
study examined whether training a more positive interpretation bias or attention bias resulted in transfer
of effects to the untrained cognitive domain. Differences in anxiety reactivity to a real-world stressor
were also assessed.
Methods: Ninety-seven ﬁrst year undergraduates who had self-reported anxiety were allocated to one of
four groups: attention bias training (n ¼ 24), interpretation bias training (n ¼ 26), control task training
(n ¼ 25) and no training (n ¼ 22). Training was computer-based and comprised eight sessions over four
weeks. Baseline and follow-up measures of attention and interpretation bias, anxiety and depression
were taken.
Results: A signiﬁcant reduction in threat-related attention bias and an increase in positive interpretation
bias occurred in the attention bias training group. The interpretation bias training group did not exhibit a
signiﬁcant change in attention bias, only interpretation bias. The effect of attention bias training on
interpretation bias was signiﬁcant as compared with the two control groups. There were no effects on
self-report measures.
Limitations: The extent to which interpretive training can modify attentional processing remains unclear.
Conclusions: Findings support the idea that attentional training might have broad cognitive conse-
quences, impacting downstream on interpretive bias. However, they do not fully support a common
mechanism hypothesis, as interpretive training did not impact on attentional bias.
© 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).1. Introduction
Cognitive models emphasise the critical role that selective
processing plays in the onset andmaintenance of anxiety (e.g., Beck
& Clark, 1997; Eysenck, 1997; Mathews & Mackintosh, 1998; Mogg
& Bradley, 1998; Williams, Watts, MacLeod, & Mathews, 1997).
Extensive research generated from these models has shown that
anxious individuals disproportionately attend to threat-relatedersity of East Anglia, Norwich
r Ltd. This is an open access articlestimuli in the environment (attention bias; cf. Bar-Haim, Lamy,
Pergamin, Bakermans-Kranenburg, & van IJzendoorn, 2007; Fox,
Russo, & Dutton, 2002; MacLeod, Mathews, & Tata, 1986) and
perceive threat-congruous meanings when processing ambiguous
information (interpretation bias; cf. Eysenck, Mogg, May, Richards,
& Mathews, 1991; Mathews & MacLeod, 2002). Modifying atten-
tional and interpretive bias using experimental procedures
(Cognitive Bias Modiﬁcation; CBM) has demonstrated the causal
role of each of these biases in anxiety (see MacLeod & Mathews,
2012, for a review).
In the CBM paradigm, participants carry out repeated trials in
which they are trained to interpret emotional ambiguity in either aunder the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
1 It should be noted that participants for this study were recruited at the
beginning of two academic years (2008 and 2010). At the start of the ﬁrst academic
year of testing, participants were randomly allocated to CBM-A (n ¼ 12), CBM-I
(n ¼ 13) and the placebo control condition (n ¼ 15). At the start of the second
academic year of testing participants were randomly allocated to CBM-A (n ¼ 12),
CBM-I (n ¼ 13), placebo control condition (n ¼ 10) and no training control (n ¼ 22)
with the restriction that group sizes would be approximately equal.
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positive direction (e.g., Beard& Amir, 2008; CBM for interpretation,
CBM-I); to attend to threat (e.g., White, Suway, Pine, Bar-Haim, &
Fox, 2011), or to attend away from threat stimuli on the computer
screen (e.g., Browning, Holmes, & Harmer, 2010; Hakamata et al.,
2010; CBM for attention, CBM-A). CBM-I to promote positive
interpretation and CBM-A to encourage attention away from threat
have been shown to reduce symptoms of anxiety in clinical and
high anxious samples (e.g., Amir, Beard, Burns, & Bomyea, 2009;
Amir & Taylor, 2012; Brosan, Hoppitt, Shelfer, Sillence, &
Mackintosh, 2011; Linetzky, Pergamin-Hight, Pine, & Bar-Haim,
2015; Salemink, van den Hout, & Kindt, 2009; Schmidt, Richey,
Buckner, & Timpano, 2009). However, whilst this research is
consistentwith the theory that the presence of one ormore of these
biases underpins anxiety, it is not known whether these biases
reﬂect one common neurocognitive mechanism. For example,
models such as Mathews andMackintosh (1998) and Bishop (2007)
propose that both attentional and interpretive biases arise from the
outcome from competition of bottom-up (a relatively automatic
threat evaluation system) and top-down (cognitive control)
cognitive processes. As these models predict that both biases arise
from the same system, it is possible that modifying the system to
alter one bias (e.g., attention), will also impact on the presence of
the other bias (e.g., interpretation). Cognitive bias modiﬁcation
paradigms therefore allow us to address such interesting theoret-
ical questions regarding the interacting nature of these two biases,
by modifying one bias and assessing impact on the other.
Additionally this can help answer important therapeutic ques-
tions, such as whether modifying one bias (e.g., attention bias) is
sufﬁcient to alter cognitive processing in other areas (e.g., in
interpretation). In order to investigate these ideas, White et al.
(2011) trained participants to attend to threat using the dot-
probe task and then assessed its impact on a test of interpretive
bias. In the training phase, two faces (one angry and one neutral)
were presented on the computer screen above and below a central
ﬁxation point. After 500 ms they disappeared, were replaced by an
arrow pointing either up or down, and participants were required
to indicate inwhich direction the arrowwas pointing. In the attend
threat training condition the probes consistently replaced the
threat-related faces, and in the placebo condition probes replaced
threat-related and neutral faces with equal probability. In a sub-
sequent test of interpretation of emotional ambiguity, attend threat
training appeared to increase the tendency of participants to make
threat-related initial interpretations of emotionally ambiguous
sentences.
These results provide initial evidence that attentional and
interpretive biases result from a common neurocognitive mecha-
nism, as opposed to being orthogonal. However, the results do not
allow us to speculate on the temporal nature of these biases. That is,
it might be that biases in attention precede and subsequently in-
ﬂuence interpretive bias in a downstream manner (Ouimet,
Gawronski, & Dozois, 2009), with the inﬂuence of interpretive
processing on upstream attentional processing beingmore difﬁcult.
Two studies have tested the impact of modifying interpretive bias
on attentional bias (Amir, Bomyea, & Beard, 2010; Mobini et al.,
2014). Consistent with a common mechanism hypothesis (in
which modifying either bias impacts on a central mechanism
related to the other bias) modifying threat-related interpretive bias
did have an impact upon threat-related attentional bias.
Although preliminary work appears to be consistent with
attentional and interpretive biases sharing a common mechanism,
these initial exciting ﬁndings clearly need replication. The prior
investigation of transfer from attentional retraining to interpretive
bias (White et al., 2011) did not assess the impact of therapeutic
CBM-A versus a control group, instead retraining attention towardsthreat. We therefore concentrated on positive (non-threat
focussed) CBM (multiple sessions of either CBM-A or CBM-I) in a
high anxious sample, enabling us to address the applied question of
whether either CBM-A or CBM-I has broader effects on the cogni-
tive biases underpinning anxiety, and as such whether one or the
other might be most beneﬁcial to use therapeutically, a question
that is currently unanswered. The present study aimed to replicate
previous ﬁndings that CBM-A modiﬁes interpretive selectivity
(White et al., 2011) and CBM-I modiﬁes attentional selectivity (e.g.,
Amir et al., 2010; Mobini et al., 2014), and develop these ﬁndings by
testing the comparative transfer effects of neutral CBM on allevi-
ating threat-related attentional and interpretive biases. We sought
to further understand the relationship between attentional and
interpretive selectivity by training one group of participants to
interpret emotional ambiguity in a positive direction (using CBM-I)
and another group to focus their attention on non-threat (as
opposed to threat-related) stimuli (CBM-A). Two control groups
served as a comparison, (placebo training and no training). The
placebo training condition alongside a no training control group
allowed us to ensure that any effects of training would be unlikely
to be due to placebo/demand characteristics. If there were no dif-
ferences between either the CBM-I/CBM-A groups with the placebo
training group, but these three groups all showed improvement
relative to our fourth control group (no training), we would be able
to determine that the results are likely to be due to a placebo effect
or demand characteristics. In line with a common mechanism hy-
pothesis, we predicted that training attention away from threat
stimuli would encourage participants to interpret emotional am-
biguity in a more positive manner, and that inducing a positive
interpretive bias would lead to participants ﬁnding it easier to
attend away from threat stimuli. In addition to these speciﬁc hy-
potheses, we also predicted that participants in the two training
groups (CBM-I and CBM-A) would show reductions in symptoms of
anxiety and depression. Finally, we asked participants to keep a
diary during the study to assess whether they encountered any
major life events throughout the training and to generally assess
how they were settling into university life.
2. Methods
2.1. Participants
Ninety-seven University of East Anglia ﬁrst year undergraduates
(67 females and 30 males, mean age 18.9 years, SD ¼ 2.06) were
recruited at the start of their ﬁrst term via emails and a poster
campaign. Four eligibility questions emailed to all interested stu-
dents had determined that participants were native English
speakers who felt anxious and/or overwhelmed about starting
University, had no difﬁculties reading or understanding text from a
computer screen and had not previously completed a University
course. Participants were randomly (with the constraint that group
size should be approximately equal) allocated to one of four con-
ditions1: attention bias training (n ¼ 24; 17 females and 7 males;
mean age 19.08 years, SD ¼ 2.93), interpretation bias training
(n¼ 26; 15 females and 11males; mean age 18.96 years, SD¼ 2.44),
control task training (n ¼ 25; 20 females and 5 males; mean age
18.84 years, SD ¼ 1.11) and no training (n ¼ 22; 15 females and 7
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conditions were paid £50 for their time and those in the no training
control group were paid £24.
2.2. Materials
2.2.1. Attention bias test
The attention bias test employed the dot-probe paradigm
similar to that of MacLeod and colleagues (MacLeod, Rutherford,
Campbell, Ebsworthy, & Holker, 2002), and was administered us-
ing E-Prime software (Schneider, Eschman, & Zuccolotto, 2002).
The dot-probe assessment consisted of 96 trials (12 word pairs)
which were administered pre and post training. In each trial, ﬁrst a
ﬁxation cross was presented in the centre of the screen for 500 ms,
followed immediately by a word pair (matched for frequency and
length). Each stimulus pair contained one neutral word (e.g.,
“detailed”) and one threat-related word (e.g., “afraid”). Words were
presented onscreen for 500 ms, equidistant above and below the
ﬁxation cross 3 cm apart. Next, an arrow probe (“<” or “>” with
equal frequency) appeared in the prior location of one of the words
until response. Participants were instructed to indicate which di-
rection the arrow was pointing by pressing the left or right arrow
key as quickly and as accurately as possible. Arrow probes replaced
the different word types (threat/neutral) with equal frequency, and
appearedwith equal probability above and below the ﬁxation cross.
A non-threat, neutral, attentional bias (i.e., an ability to attend away
from threat) was indicated by faster reaction times to probes in
non-threat word positions (as opposed to probes replacing threat
words).
2.2.2. Attention bias modiﬁcation CBM-A
Attention bias training, also administered using E-Prime
(Schneider et al., 2002), comprised eight sessions spread over four
weeks and was again similar to that used originally by MacLeod
et al. (2002) and in line with that used by See, MacLeod, and
Bridle (2009). Each session consisted of 384 trials (96 word pairs
in total). Training took the same format as in the attention bias test,
except that the arrow was always in the position of the neutral
word in each pair, with the intention of retraining attention away
from the anxiety related material. Participants keyed in the direc-
tion of the arrow probe (randomised for each trial), which cleared
the screen and initiated the next trial after 1 s. In the ﬁrst training
session the same twelve word pairs were used as in the bias test. In
each subsequent training session an additional twelve word pairs
were added to the stimulus set, although the number of trials
remained the same.
2.2.3. Interpretation bias test
Based onMathews andMackintosh (2000), in the interpretation
bias test ten emotionally ambiguous vignettes were ﬁrstly pre-
sented on screen using E-Run software (Schneider et al., 2002).
Participants were asked to read and imagine themselves vividly in
each situation. Each vignette related to one of two categories, either
typical social performance or social interaction situations, for
instance: “The bus ride: You get on a bus and ﬁnd an empty seat next
to one that has a rip in it. At the next stop several people get on and the
seat next to you remains vacant.” Each scenario contained four lines,
appearing on screen one at a time when the participant pressed a
key indicating they were ready to advance. After each one, partic-
ipants rated how pleasant they found the scenario on a scale of 1e9
(9 being most pleasant) and how vividly they had imagined
themselves in the scenario on a scale of 1e5 (5 being most vivid).
Note that we found no signiﬁcant impact of training on pleasant-
ness ratings, and these are not discussed further. Given the strong
relationship between imagery and emotion it is possible thatenhanced vividness of imagery could lead to stronger emotional
effects (Holmes & Mathews, 2005). We therefore assessed vivid-
ness of imagery in order to rule this out. A comprehension question
then followed to check participants had read and understood the
situation described (e.g., “Were the people who got on strangers to
you?”). Responses were collected using left and right arrow keys
and feedback indicated whether the response had been “Correct!”
or “Incorrect”. Feedback was followed immediately by presentation
of a new titled scenario. The order in which scenarios were pre-
sented was conserved across all participants.
After the ten vignettes had been presented, interpretation bias
was measured using the recognition test. In this test, the title of the
ﬁrst scenario was presented along with four unambiguous state-
ments related to each scenario (presented one at a time). Partici-
pants rated how similar each statement was in meaning to the
scenario with that title, on a scale of 1e4 (4 being very similar in
meaning). Two of the four statements were foils that were not
possible interpretations and two were target items that were
possible interpretations of the scenario. For each scenario, one
target and one foil statement described a positive outcome (e.g.,
“The seat next to you remains empty because it is damaged” and “The
person in the seat next to you talks to you in a friendly way” respec-
tively) and one target and one foil statement described a negative
outcome (e.g., “The seat next to you is empty because no one wants to
sit with you” and “The person in the seat next you makes a rip in the
fabric” respectively). In this task, higher similarity ratings for
negative targets as compared to positive targets reﬂects a more
negative interpretive bias. The foil scenarios allow an understand-
ing of whether the intervention has led to a change in interpreta-
tion per se, or a more general response bias to respond differently
to positive/negative material. Order of presentation of the four
recognition statements was randomised. There were two versions
of the interpretation bias test which were identical in structure and
theme but contained different scenarios. Each participant
completed one version at baseline and the other version at post-
training (order was counterbalanced across participants).
2.2.4. Interpretation bias modiﬁcation CBM-I
The interpretation bias training was based on the method used
originally by Mathews and Mackintosh (2000). Each of the eight
CBM-I sessions, also administered using E-Prime (Schneider et al.,
2002), comprised 21 scenarios (with new scenarios in each ses-
sion) which participants read on screen. They related to concerns
that new students might have, including homesickness, ﬁnancial,
academic and social concerns. Each scenario had the ﬁnal word
missing and was ambiguous up to this point (e.g., “A new course
tutor is appointed for your history class and you hear that they are
very disciplined and hard working. When you meet them for the ﬁrst
time to discuss your interests, you think that your tutor found your
work ——”). The ﬁnal word always resolved the ambiguity in a
positive way, and was presented in an incomplete form on the
screen after the participant had read the preceding scenario (e.g.,
th-r—h “thorough”). The participants’ task was to use the preceding
scenario to create an image and use this to identify the incomplete
word, and type in the ﬁrst missing letter. A comprehension ques-
tion was then shown that related to an interpretation of the sce-
nario (e.g., “Did your new tutor have a bad opinion of your work?”).
Participants used the arrow keys to answer “Yes” or “No” to this
question, followed by feedback (a “Correct!” or “Incorrect”message).
There was no overlap in the materials used for interpretive training
and interpretive bias assessment.
2.2.5. CBM-placebo training
These were exactly as for the attentional CBM-A training group,
except that household words were used instead of anxiety-related
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household neutral word, and the arrow probe was distributed
with equal probability between word types.
2.2.6. Anxiety and depression questionnaires
Participants completed self-report measures of anxiety and
depression at baseline, post-training and two-week follow-up.
Social anxiety and trait anxiety were assessed using the Fear of
Negative Evaluation scale (FNE; Watson & Friend, 1969) and trait
scale of the Spielberger State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI-T;
Spielberger, Gorsuch, Lushene, Vagg, & Jacobs, 1983), respectively.
Depressionwasmeasured using the Beck Depression Inventory 2nd
Edition (BDI-II; Beck, Steer, & Brown, 1996).
2.2.7. Weekly diary and feedback questionnaires
A weekly diary questionnaire was developed to check how
students were coping with and adjusting to University life. The
questions related to social life, family contact, health, academic
attendance and performance, homework deadlines, meetings with
advisers and paid employment and consisted of a mixture of open
ended questions and ratings. Two feedback questionnaires, also
developed for the present research, probed how participants had
found their experience of the study. These were included for
practical reasons to gain feedback on participants’ experience
during the course of the study, and no formal analysis of data from
these is presented.
2.3. Procedure
2.3.1. First test session (baseline)
Ethical approval for the study was obtained from the University
of East Anglia School of SocialWork and Psychology Research Ethics
Committee. Participants were informed on an information sheet
that we were interested in ﬁnding ways in which we could help
make the transition to university easier and were not given any
further indication regarding how the tasks might be working to
help them. After written consent had been given, eligible partici-
pants completed the ﬁrst session of the study at which baseline
measures of attentional bias, interpretive bias, fear of negative
evaluations, trait anxiety and depression were taken. Following
this, participants in the no training group were thanked and asked
to return to the psychology laboratory in four weeks. All other
participants performed a practice version of the training task spe-
ciﬁc to their group in preparation for the training sessions that
would form the next part of the study.
2.3.2. Training sessions: CBM-A, CBM-I and CBM-placebo training
Participants completed eight training sessions speciﬁc to their
condition in the laboratory. They were instructed to complete two
half-hour sessions per week for four weeks, with the sessions al-
ways being on separate days, although in practice this schedule wasTable 1
Mean age, trait anxiety (STAI-T), depression (BDI-II) and fear of negative evaluations (FN
CBM-A (n ¼ 22) CBM-I (n ¼ 26)
M SD M SD
Age 19.14 3.06 18.96 2.34
Female:Male 15:7 15:11
STAI-T 48.18 9.08 47.12 8.58
BDI-II 14.64 6.92 13.65 8.40
FNE 21.57 6.42 18.08 6.95
Attention bias 3.86 15.19 3.15 12.00
Interpretation bias 0.24 0.55 0.05 0.64
Note: all F values were non-signiﬁcant (p > 0.1).not always possible (see Participants section of Results). Two par-
ticipants completed training sessions back to back (i.e., on the same
day). Three participants missed one training session (one from
CBM-I, one from CBM-A and one from CBM-placebo). One further
participant from the CBM-placebo condition missed two training
sessions. During the four week training period all participants
(including the no training control group) were sent the weekly
diary questionnaire once a week, which they subsequently ﬁlled in
and returned via email.
2.3.3. Second and third test session (post-training and follow-up)
The second test session (post-training) was scheduled to take
place two to seven days after completion of the eighth training
session, and four weeks after the ﬁrst test session for the no
training control group. It included measures of attentional bias,
interpretive bias, fear of negative evaluations, trait anxiety and
depression. The third (follow-up) session of the study took place
two weeks after the post-training session and included only an
assessment of fear of negative evaluation, trait anxiety and
depression, and debrieﬁng after the feedback questionnaires had
been completed.
3. Results
3.1. Participants
Three participants were excluded from the analysis. Two par-
ticipants (one CBM-A; one control training) experienced signiﬁcant
life events and had excessive gaps between sessions (as reported in
their weekly diary questionnaires), and one (CBM-A) exhibited high
levels of inaccuracy in attention bias training sessions (>3 SD from
group mean). The descriptive statistics for age, gender and baseline
trait anxiety, depression and fear of negative evaluation are pre-
sented in Table 1. All groups were comparable at baseline on all
measures of anxiety, depression, attention bias and interpretation
bias (all Fs < 1.5, ns).
Overall, the sample (N ¼ 94) had a mean trait anxiety score of
48.40, which is approximately one standard deviation above the
STAI-T reported norms and equivalent to around the 78th percen-
tile for University students (Spielberger et al., 1983). They had a
mean BDI-II score of 14.98, indicative of mild depression levels
(Beck et al., 1996), and a mean FNE score of 20.17 corresponding
with scorers who are sometimes fearful in social-evaluative situa-
tions (Watson & Friend, 1969).
3.2. Impact of CBM on attentional bias
In keeping with the approach adopted by MacLeod et al. (2002),
median RTs to the probe following each word type (threat-related
and neutral) were calculated for every participant and RTs were
excluded if they were less than 200 ms and greater than 2000 ms.E) with standard deviations and gender ratio.
CBM-placebo (n ¼ 24) No training (n ¼ 22) F test
M SD M SD
18.83 1.13 18.68 0.95 0.19
19:5 15:7
50.25 9.19 48.14 10.38 0.49
17.54 7.32 13.73 8.15 1.33
20.38 6.91 21.09 7.93 1.17
2.46 14.78 0.11 14.16 1.17
0.44 0.82 0.20 0.59 1.46
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Fig. 1. Mean attentional bias index at baseline and post-training (a more positive score
indicates a more positive attentional bias). Error bar represent ± 1 standard error.
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approach, one participant was found to have outlying attention bias
scores (RT to threat-related words minus RT to neutral words in
milliseconds) reﬂecting a very negative bias at baseline and a very
positive bias in the post-training session; these values were
replaced with the next extreme plus one (Tabachnick & Fidell,
2001). All four groups averaged 94% accuracy (number of times
the correct probe direction was keyed) on the attention bias test in
both the baseline and post-training sessions; two participants who
had low accuracy within a single session (control task group, 82%
accuracy, baseline; no training group, 80%, post-training) were
retained in the analysis. To assess change in bias over the training
period, an attentional bias index was calculated by subtracting the
median reaction time (ms) to neutral words from the median re-
action time (ms) to threat-related words. Therefore, a negative
score reﬂected participants showing a more threat-related atten-
tional bias.
A one-way ANOVA conﬁrmed there had been no signiﬁcant
differences between groups in baseline attention bias index, F (3,
90) ¼ 1.01, p ¼ 0.39; see Fig. 1. A mixed model ANOVA with time
(baseline, post-training) as the within participants factor and group
(CBM-A, CBM-I, CBM-placebo or no training) as the between sub-
jects factor was conducted on the attentional bias index data. No
main effect of time was found, F (1, 90) ¼ 1.08, p ¼ 0.30, hp2 ¼ 0.01.
There was, however, a trend-level time by group interaction, F (3,
90)¼ 2.16, p¼ 0.099, hp2 ¼ 0.067. Because of our speciﬁc predictions
that both attention bias training and interpretation bias training
would inﬂuence attention bias, but that the control groups would
not, we conducted paired sampled t-tests within each group to
examine changes in attention bias scores from baseline to post-
training. The only signiﬁcant ﬁnding was of CBM-A, t
(21) ¼ 2.08, p ¼ 0.025, (one-tailed), r ¼ 0.42, indicating that as
predicted the attentional training resulted in a signiﬁcant reduction
in threat-related attention bias from pre-training to post-training.
Contrary to prediction, the CBM-I group did not generate a signif-
icant reduction in attention bias, t (25)¼ 0.44, p¼ 0.34 (one-tailed),
and any alterations in bias in both control groups were similarly
non-signiﬁcant, ts < 1 (see Fig. 1)2.3.3. Impact of CBM on interpretation bias
One participant who due to computer error did not complete
the second interpretation bias test could not be included in the
analysis. Change in interpretation bias over the four weeks was
assessed using a mixed model ANOVA with time (baseline, post-
training), scenario category (social interaction, performance),2 The failure to ﬁnd the predicted signiﬁcant difference between the CBM-A
group and the control groups for attention bias raises the possibility that the
intended attentional bias modiﬁcation was not achieved. There is growing evidence
that CBM may be particularly efﬁcacious for participants who have a pre-existing
cognitive bias to threat, but be less beneﬁcial for individuals with no pre-existing
bias (e.g., Fox, Zougkou, Ashwin, & Cahill, 2015; Maoz, Abend, Fox, Pine, & Bar-
Haim, 2013; Mogoas¸e, David, & Koster, 2014). This could result in a reduction in
statistical power (hence the trend-level ﬁnding for attention) if the intervention
affected participants differently based on their pre-existing bias scores. Since levels
of attentional and interpretive bias did not differ signiﬁcantly between groups
(Table 1), we decided to rerun analyses with baseline attentional/interpretive bias
included as a covariate. For attention, there was a signiﬁcant effect of baseline
attention bias, F (1, 89) ¼ 129.21, p < 0.001, hp2 ¼ 0.59, and a signiﬁcant effect of
group on change in attention bias, F (3, 89) ¼ 3.46, p ¼ 0.02, hp2 ¼ 0.11. For inter-
pretation, there was a signiﬁcant effect of baseline interpretive bias, F (1,
89) ¼ 44.51, p < 0.001, hp2 ¼ 0.33, and a signiﬁcant effect of group on change in
interpretive bias, F (3, 89) ¼ 2.87, p ¼ 0.041, hp2 ¼ 0.09. Overall, these ﬁndings
suggest that CBM-A reliably modiﬁed attention bias when the effect of baseline bias
was removed from the analysis. CBM-I was similarly successful in modifying
interpretation bias.sentence type (foil, target) and sentence valence (positive, nega-
tive) as the within subjects variables and training group as the
between subjects factor. There was a main effect of time, F (1,
89) ¼ 4.06, p ¼ 0.047, hp2 ¼ 0.04, indicating there had been an
overall increase in positive interpretation bias, and of category, F (1,
89)¼ 73.39, p< 0.001, hp2¼ 0.45, with performance sentences being
endorsed more than social interaction sentences. There was also a
main effect of type, F (1, 89) ¼ 7.72, p < 0.001, hp2 ¼ 0.90, suggesting
greater endorsement of possible interpretations of the scenarios
than of foils, and valence, F (1, 89)¼ 48.39, p< 0.001, hp2¼ 0.35, with
positive sentences being selected more than negative ones.
Crucially, however, these effects were qualiﬁed by a signiﬁcant time
by valence by group interaction, F (3, 89) ¼ 3.55, p ¼ 0.018,
hp
2 ¼ 0.11, and a signiﬁcant time by type by valence by group
interaction, F (3, 89) ¼ 3.21, p ¼ 0.027, hp2 ¼ 0.10.
To examine the four-way interaction of time by type by valence
by group more closely, separate analyses were conducted on target
sentences (i.e., possible interpretations of the scenarios) and foil
sentences. On targets, there was a signiﬁcant time by valence by
group interaction, F (3, 89) ¼ 3.88, p ¼ 0.012, hp2 ¼ 0.12, whereas on
foils, the time by valence by group interaction was non-signiﬁcant,
F (3, 89) ¼ 1.57, p ¼ 0.20.
To further explore the time by valence by group interaction on
target sentences, an interpretation bias index was calculated by
subtracting the mean recognition ratings for negative target sen-
tences from the mean recognition ratings for positive target sen-
tences. A mixed model ANOVA revealed a signiﬁcant main effect of
time, F (1, 89)¼ 14.94, p < 0.001 hp2 ¼ 0.14, qualiﬁed by a signiﬁcant
group by time interaction, F (3, 89) ¼ 3.89, p ¼ 0.012, hp2 ¼ 0.12.
Paired sample t-tests conducted on the interpretation bias test data
revealed that both the attention training group, t (21) ¼ 2.04,
p ¼ 0.027 (one-tailed), r ¼ - 0.41, and the interpretation training
group, t (25) ¼ 5.20, p < 0.001 (one-tailed), r ¼ 0.72, displayed a
signiﬁcantly more positive interpretation bias at post-training than
baseline. The change in interpretation bias did not reach signiﬁ-
cance in the control training group, t (22) ¼ 0.024, p ¼ 0.49 (one-
tailed), or no training group, t (21)¼0.91, p¼ 0.19 (one-tailed; see
Fig. 2).
A separatemixedmodel ANOVAwas conducted on the ratings of
how vividly each scenario was imagined, with time (baseline, post-
training) and category (social interaction, performance) entered as
the within subjects factors and group entered as the between
subjects factor. This revealed a main effect of category, F (1,
89) ¼ 29.34, p < 0.001, hp2 ¼ 0.25, and a time by category by group
interaction, F (3, 89)¼ 2.79, p¼ 0.045, hp2 ¼ 0.086. Follow-up paired
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Fig. 2. Mean interpretive bias index at baseline and post-training (a more positive
score indicates a more positive interpretive bias). Error bars represent ± 1 standard
error.
J.O. Bowler et al. / J. Behav. Ther. & Exp. Psychiat. 54 (2017) 239e246244sample t-tests suggested that the only signiﬁcant changewas in the
control training group who had imagined performance situations
signiﬁcantly more vividly at post-training (M ¼ 3.30, SD ¼ 0.75)
than baseline (M ¼ 2.91, SD ¼ 0.72), t (22) ¼ 3.27, p ¼ 0.004,
r ¼ 0.57.
3.4. Further analysis of asymmetrical transfer effects
To further explore the apparent asymmetrical transfer effect
(where CBM-A generalises to interpretive bias, but CBM-I does not
generalise to attentional bias) positive bias increase scores were
computed to directly compare improvement in interpretive bias
with improvement in attention bias for the CBM-A and CBM-I
groups only. These increase scores were then converted to z-
scores so change in each bias could be directly compared. A mixed
model ANOVAwas runwith bias (attention or interpretation) as the
within groups factor and group (CBM-A, CBM-I) as the between
groups factor. Results indicated a signiﬁcant interaction between
bias and group, F (1, 46) ¼ 6.61, p ¼ 0.013, hp2 ¼ 0.13. Planned
comparisons suggested that for attention training there was no
differential impact on attention versus interpretive bias, t
(21) ¼ 1.17, p ¼ 0.26. For interpretive training the effect on inter-
pretive bias was clearly stronger than the effect on attentional bias,
t (25) ¼ - 2.72, p ¼ 0.012, r ¼ 0.48.
3.5. Impact of CBM on self-report measures of anxiety and
depression
One participant in the no training group whose scores on the
BDI-II were above three standard deviations from the mean at
baseline and post-training were replaced with the next extreme
plus one (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2001). Separate mixed model
ANOVAs (one for each outcome measure) were performed on theTable 2
Mean self-reported trait anxiety (STAI-T), fear of negative evaluations (FNE), and depres
Baseline (pre-training) Post-training
STAI-T FNE BDI-II STAI-T
CBM-A 48.18 (9.08) 21.57 (6.42) 14.64 (6.92) 45.68 (7.71)
CBM-I 47.12 (8.58) 18.08 6.95) 13.65 (8.40) 42.46 (7.07)
CBM-placebo 50.25 (9.19) 20.38 (6.91) 17.54 (7.32) 44.29 (9.55)
No training 48.14 (10.38) 21.09 (7.93) 13.73 (8.15) 43.68 (11.88)
Note: standard deviations in parentheses.data, each with time (baseline, post-training, follow-up) as the
within subjects variables and group (CBM-A, CBM-I, placebo
training or no training) as the between subjects variable. Results
revealed a main effect of time (p < 0.001) for all three measures,
indicating all participants felt better as the study progressed, but
signiﬁcant time by group interactions were not found for trait
anxiety, F (4.73, 141.7) ¼ 1.26, p ¼ 0.29, or fear of negative evalua-
tion, F < 1, see Table 2. For depression, results indicated a near
signiﬁcant interaction, F (4.84, 145.2) ¼ 2.13, p ¼ 0.068, hp2 ¼ 0.066.
Follow-up LSD tests however indicated that the differences in
depression reduction between groups had been non-signiﬁcant,
ps > 0.1, see Table 2.4. Discussion
The results demonstrate that both methods of cognitive bias
modiﬁcation (attentional and interpretive) can successfully modify
cognitive responding within the trained domain. Interpretation
bias test ﬁndings clearly demonstrated that positive interpretive
training enhanced positive interpretation bias, and, although the
attention bias test time by group interaction was at trend-level
signiﬁcance, further analyses indicated that attention bias
training to avoid threat had modiﬁed attentional bias in the ex-
pected direction. Crucially, in addition the present study suggests
that training attention away from threat (CBM-A) transfers across a
cognitive domain, inﬂuencing subsequent interpretation of
emotional ambiguity, with a substantial increase in positive inter-
pretive bias evident in the attentional training group. Previous
research (White et al., 2011) has only demonstrated this transfer
effect with attentional training to attend to threat; the present
results suggest that in high anxious individuals, attentional training
to avoid threat (and attend to non-threat stimuli) could impact on
both their attentional and interpretive bias. However, contrary to
previous research (Amir et al., 2010; Mobini et al., 2014), the
demonstrated transfer effects were not reciprocal, and interpretive
training (CBM-I) did not aid attentional avoidance of threat stimuli
over neutral stimuli.
The ﬁndings that modifying attentional bias has an impact on
interpretive bias are in line with current models which propose
biased attentional and interpretive processes are not orthogonal
and instead result from a single common mechanism (e.g., Bishop,
2007;Mathews&Mackintosh,1998). However, thesemodels might
also predict that modifying interpretive bias should impact upon
attentional bias (given the shared mechanism underlying them).
Although there is some evidence suggesting this to be the case
(Amir et al., 2010; Mobini et al., 2014), wewere not able to replicate
this ﬁnding in the present study. This could be due to methodo-
logical differences between the studies. For example, whereas in
the present study the post-training assessment of attentional bias
took place two to seven days after the ﬁnal CBM session, in both of
the prior studies effects on attentional bias were apparent only
immediately following a single session of CBM-I (Amir et al. 2010;
Mobini et al., 2014). One of the studies also measured attentionalsion scores (BDI-II) at baseline, post-training and follow-up.
Follow-up
FNE BDI-II STAI-T FNE BDI-II
20.27 (6.78) 12.95 (5.69) 45.14 (8.26) 18.45 (8.11) 11.59 (5.53)
16.08 (9.13) 10.81 (6.66) 41.42 (9.64) 14.77 (9.18) 8.04 (5.43)
17.42 (8.04) 11.50 (5.32) 42.42 (8.87) 16.63 (8.04) 11.50 (6.19)
18.14 (8.29) 11.64 (9.31) 41.82 (12.08) 17.59 (8.42) 9.73 (9.43)
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(Mobini et al., 2014). Nonetheless, the discrepancy in ﬁndings
suggests further work is clearly needed. For example, it is possible
that attentional training might at least have broader or more easily
generalisable cognitive effects as compared to interpretive training,
perhaps due to additional downstream impacts upon interpretive
bias.
Although in the present experiment CBM successfully modiﬁed
attentional and interpretive processing of threat-related informa-
tion, it did not impact on either trait anxiety, depression or fear of
negative evaluation over and above our control conditions (all
groups showed signiﬁcant decreases on self-report measures of
anxiety, fear of negative evaluations and depression). This appears
to be in contrast to previous studies that have shown successful use
of CBM to reduce high anxiety in non-clinical populations (e.g.,
Beard & Amir, 2008; Murphy et al., 2007; Salemink et al., 2009).
There are three possible explanations for this unexpected ﬁnding.
First, it is possible that the current intervention did not provide
enough training to be effective (for example, there were only 21
training trials in each session for the interpretive training), and that
by increasing the “dosage” the effects of CBM on self-report anxiety
and depressionmight become apparent. Second, the absence of any
effects on anxiety and depression could have been due to the fact
that our participants did not start with clearly negative cognitive
biases. For example, across the groups the mean scores suggest a
relatively more positive interpretive bias at baseline. This could be
problematic in terms of the success of CBM given that research
suggests that having a more threat-related bias at baseline is linked
to greater symptom reduction (Amir, Taylor, & Donohue, 2011).
Third, in the present study students did not complete the training
program prior to the real-world stressor, instead beginning training
after they had arrived at University. This is a crucial difference
between the current study and previous research which has sug-
gested, contrary to the present ﬁndings, that CBM for attention can
attenuate anxiety associated with starting university as compared
to a no training control group (See et al., 2009). In their study, See
et al. (2009) asked participants to take part in the training program
prior to starting at university (which was overseas), then anxiety
was assessed during the subsequent stressor (on arrival in the
country and 48 h after the ﬁnal training session). In the current
experiment students were asked to take part in the training pro-
gram during the stressor, training began once term had started and
the post-training measurement of anxiety, fear and depression
occurred four weeks later. Whereas See et al. (2009) found that
anxiety had increased over training in both their groups (CBM-A
and control), this increase was attenuated in the CBM-A group. In
the current experiment all groups showed relatively large de-
creases in anxiety, fear and depression over time (which might
have occurred naturally, or perhaps due to some therapeutic effect
of carrying out the weekly diary task in the present study). Hence,
in comparisonwith the previous ﬁnding, it seems that commencing
training after all ﬁrst year undergraduate students had successfully
moved onto campus and started their University career failed to
capture anxiety reactivity to the stressful event itself.
Although an effect on anxiety reactivity was not demonstrated,
the ﬁnding that training attention away from threat reduces threat-
related interpretation bias might have important therapeutic im-
plications. Past research has indicated that severe threat-related
attention bias may predict poor treatment response to Cognitive
Behavioural Therapy (CBT), commonly used in the treatment of
anxiety (Legerstee et al., 2009; Rachman, 2015). The results of the
present study and previous research (White et al., 2011) suggest
that it would be beneﬁcial for negative attention bias to be targeted
with modiﬁcation procedures prior to commencing CBT. The broad
cognitive effects of attention bias modiﬁcation indicate that thismight facilitate downstream cognitive restructuring, potentially
enhancing CBT efﬁcacy. Hence attention bias modiﬁcation could be
used as an at home waiting list treatment (Brosan et al., 2011), or
alternatively as an adjunct therapy (Amir & Taylor, 2012; Linetzky
et al., 2015; Shechner et al., 2014). The present experiment tenta-
tively suggests that attentional training alone might be more
beneﬁcial in a therapeutic sense than interpretive training alone
(due to the transfer across cognitive biases). However, given the
discrepant ﬁndings in the literature (the contrast between the
present study and, Amir et al. 2010; Mobini et al., 2014) it is too
early to conclude this, and further research is clearly warranted.
Current ﬁndings should be interpreted in view of several limi-
tations not previously mentioned. First, the factorial design
entailed that, whilst 97 participants completed the study, only one
quarter of this sample was allocated to each group. Reverse transfer
effects (from CBM-I to attention) may have been discernible had
group sizes been larger. Second, the nature of any CBM-A effects on
attentional bias is subject to the reliability of the visual-probe task,
criticised by some commentators (e.g., Staugaard, 2009). Whilst it
would certainly be beneﬁcial for future research to examine how
bias modiﬁcation and assessment can be optimised (e.g., Clarke,
Notebaert, & MacLeod, 2014; MacLeod & Clarke, 2015), the pre-
sent effect of CBM-A (although a trend, statistically reliable when
baseline bias was held constant) on attentional bias combined with
its far transfer effects to interpretive bias suggest that it was suf-
ﬁciently robust to impact on both processing modalities. Never-
theless, replication of ﬁndings is needed before ﬁrm conclusions
can be drawn. The post hoc ﬁnding that the impact of CBM on
alleviating threat bias was affected by pre-existing processing
selectivity suggests it might be important in future work to
consider more closely the bias proﬁle of participants at baseline,
and how this relates to subsequent change in threat bias and
symptom outcomes (cf. e.g., Fox et al., 2015; MacLeod & Clarke,
2015; Maoz et al., 2013; Mogoas¸e et al., 2014). Third, it would
have been preferable for the attentional bias test to have included
words that were not used in the retraining procedure. Use of the
same stimuli across tasks leaves open the possibility that the
observed impact of CBM-A on attention reﬂected a learned atten-
tional response to the speciﬁc training words, rather than modiﬁed
attention to the target emotional class of information. However, the
fact that CBM-A transferred to a measure of interpretive bias sug-
gests that it induced more than a simple trained response to
particular words employed within the program. There is also good
evidence from other studies using different stimuli that CBM-A
modiﬁes threat-related attentional selectivity (e.g., Hakamata
et al., 2010). Fourth, the control task for CBM-A and CBM-I would
ideally have utilised sham training (i.e., applied the same stimuli as
in each of the active programs, without the training contingency) to
mitigate the possibility that training effects were due to differential
exposure to emotional information and not the intended atten-
tional/interpretive mechanisms. This would have led to three
control groups, however, which was not possible given our pool of
potential participants. The present CBM-placebo program was
intended to control for taking part in a computer task in the labo-
ratory on multiple occasions. Fifth, although selected as a widely
used measure of interpretive bias that has established sensitivity in
detecting threat bias change (e.g., Mobini, Reynolds, &Mackintosh,
2013), the recognition task may be criticised for not being process-
pure as the similarity ratings (fromwhich the bias index is derived)
are based on participants’ recollections of the earlier presented
scenarios. This leaves unclear whether attentional retraining affects
early, spontaneous interpretive selectivity or later more elaborative
processes involved in the retrieval and assimilation of content (cf.
Rusu & Pincus, 2012). Future research could address this question
using different measures of interpretive bias.
J.O. Bowler et al. / J. Behav. Ther. & Exp. Psychiat. 54 (2017) 239e246246In conclusion, we found that when participants completed a
four week programme of CBM-A, threat-related attention bias was
alleviated and interpretation bias became more positive, in a group
of participants who had self-reported anxiety about starting Uni-
versity. This result suggests that CBM-Amight have broad cognitive
effects if used in a therapeutic setting. In contrast, we failed to
replicate previous research which has suggested the reverse is also
true (Amir et al. 2010; Mobini et al., 2014). In the present study,
participants completing a four week course of CBM-I did not exhibit
similar transfer of effects to the untrained attentional domain.
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